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Abstract:  
This paper investigates the ownership concentration as a governance mechanism, and its 
implications over firm value. We conduct an empirical analysis over all Italian listed firm in a 
four-years period (2006-2009). The results show a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm value except in 2008, when the results show a non-linear relationship, 
suggesting that the financial crisis has enhanced the expropriation effects. 
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Introduction: 
Prior existing literature has highlighted the agency problem of shareholders 
concentration over minority shareholders (Berle & Means, 1933). The subject of ownership 
concentration has been a subject of interest for both transition and developed economies 
because of its doubtful effects over firm value. Morck et al. (1988) results on insider 
ownership provide evidences of a non-monotonic relation with firm value. The estimated 
piecewise regression is positive for management holdings of shares between 0% and 5% of 
outstanding shares; negative for management holdings between 5% and 25%; and positive 
once more for management holdings greater than 25%. However these results are contrasted 
by other evidences. For instance, Demsetz & Villalonga (2001) find that the ownership 
structure ought to be influenced by the profit-maximizing interests of shareholders, so that, as 
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a result, there should be no systematic relation between variations in ownership structure and 
variations in firm value. 
We conduct an analysis of 203 listed firms in Italy. The sample data are collected from 
Amadeus for two periods: pre and post crisis (2006-2007 and 2008-2009). The analysis aims 
to investigate the effects of ownership concentration over firm value after controlling for other 
firm characteristics. We find a changing relationship ownership concentration and firm 
performance in 2008, suggesting that the financial crisis has enhanced the expropriation 
effects. 
 
1. Ownership Concentration 
It is generally accepted that ownership structure is an important component of 
corporate governance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). The relationship between ownership 
structure and economic performance has been a topic of great interest in strategic 
management literature (Oswald & John S. Jahera, 1991; Li & Simerly, 1998; Bethel & 
Liebeskind, 1993; Demsetz & Villalonga, Ownership structure and corporate performance, 
2001).  
Since Berle and Means (1932) it has been largely argued that ownership structure is 
related positively related to firm profitability. Continuing this debate, other scholars have 
examined and generally given supporting evidences to the agency theory expectations (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976) that separation between ownership and control provides managerial 
incentives to diversification because of the personal benefits that managers would acquire 
from risk reduction. Indeed, large number of shareholders cannot exercise enough power to 
oversee managerial performance. Consequently, managers exercise more freedom in the use 
of firm resources as they would in case of a single shareholder or if the ownership would have 
been more concentrated (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
In studies of diversification strategy, it is found that managers assume more personal 
benefits (financial and reputational) in product or market diversification because of risk 
aversion, expense preference, and empire building (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). Ownership 
concentration, can counteract corporate diversification and gain more shareholder value. 
Agency theory argues that managers tend to increase their wealth and reputation by 
diversification and fast growth without maximizing firm market value (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Consequently, managers are not willing to downsize or reverse diversification if they 
are not pressured or obliged by ownership or external investors, to follow owners’ interests in 
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increasing firm market value. Therefore, according to the agency theory, managers’ 
propensity to increase firm value depends, ceteris paribus, on the ownership structure.  
Supporting this theory, in a landmark work, Amihud and Lev (1981) examine empirically this 
theory, confirming that managers working in firms with large shareholders were less likely to 
invest in non-related mergers or acquisitions.  
These findings were supported by Hill and Snell (1989) who conclude that that 
diversification, investment in R&D, capital intensity, and ownership structure all determine 
firm productivity. They argue that large shareholders control is negatively related to product 
diversification. 
Another stream of research in corporate governance studies, takes into consideration 
the controlling mechanisms that induce managers to be aligned with shareholders’ interests. 
An example of these controlling mechanisms is ownership concentration as it involves a 
trade-off between risk and incentive efficiency (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Demsetz, 1983; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Larger shareholders might have stronger incentives to monitor and 
therefore, they should oblige managers to be aligned with their objective of increasing the 
value of their shares.  
But on the other side, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that ownership concentration 
above a certain level will allow managers to become entrenched and expropriate the wealth of 
minority shareholders. This argument has leaded scholars in a hot debate over the possible 
non-linear relation of ownership concentration and firm performance. 
As ownership dispersion creates possibilities for free riding (Li & Simerly, 1998) 
because of a lack of monitoring on management, a positive relation of ownership 
concentration with firm value is expected. Consistent with this monitoring theory, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986) show the important role of large shareholders and how the market value is 
positively related to increasing values of shares held by larger shareholders. Nevertheless, 
recent studies have emphasized another source of agency problem created by rising ownership 
concentration that gives more power to a circumscribed number of shareholders, that in turn 
might expropriate value from minority shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 
1999). This is true for certain countries (i.e. in Europe) where the agency problem comes from 
the conflict between controlling owners and minority shareholders, instead of between 
ownership and management. In this case, large owners might be costly as they can redistribute 
wealth in both efficient and inefficient way from minority shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 
Large shareholders and corporate control, 1986). 
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Another stream of research has examined the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm value suggesting that contrary to conventional wisdom, firm performance might 
influence ownership structure, but not vice versa (Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; 
Chang, 2003). 
Despite this long debate, there is little empirical evidence on the effects of ownership 
structure in Europe as prior empirical literature has majorly provided documentation for U.S. 
and U.K. firms (De Miguel, Pindado, & De La Torre, 2004). Furthermore, at the best of our 
knowledge, there are no studies on the effects of the recent financial crises over the relation 
between ownership concentration and firm performance.  
Our analysis fits in this research stream which aims in controlling the relation between 
ownership concentration and firm performance by giving empirical evidences on the influence 
of ownership structure over firm performance for all the listed Italian firms over 2006-2009. 
In addition we study the changes of this relation due to the financial crisis in 2008 – 2009.  
We conclude by giving evidences of the changing relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance as effect of the financial crisis. 
 
2. Research Design 
The objective, the sample selection criteria and the model used to test our hypothesis 
are elaborated in a detailed way on this section.  
 
2.1. Methodological Approach 
As stated before, prior empirical studies have proved that the relationship between 
ownership and firm performance can assume linear or non-linear relation. Our objective is to 
analyze this relation and to verify if the financial crisis has influenced its state.  
Despite empirical evidences that assume linear relationship between performance and 
ownership concentration (Hill & Snell, External control, corporate strategy, and firm 
performance in research-intensive industries, 1988; Leech & Leahy, 1991; Lehmann & 
Weigand, 2000; Morck, Nakamura, & Shivdasani, 2000), there are other controversy theories 
that suggest the possibility of a non-linear relationship. On one hand, increasing ownership 
influences positively firm value as large shareholders would play an important role to increase 
the price of firm’s shares (Shleifer & Vishny, Large shareholders and corporate control, 
1986). On the other hand, concentrated ownership may also lead to worse performance 
because of the expropriation effects and the risk of minority shareholders (1997).  
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By these means, we aim to study the relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm performance and its evolution over time, in order to assess the effects of the global 
crisis. We expect to find that firm performance has a positive linear relation with ownership 
concentration or that firm value increases with ownership concentration at low levels (as a 
result of the monitoring effect), and decreases with ownership concentration at high levels (as 
a consequence of the expropriation effect). 
 
To test these hypotheses, we use the following models: 
Model 1: ROA = α + β1 × OC + β2 × Size + β3 × TD/E + ε 
and 
Model 1: ROA = α + β1 × OC + β2 × OC
2
 + β3 × Size + β4 × TD/E + ε 
Where 
 
Dependent 
ROA is the Return on Assets, calculated as 100 × Net income before preferred 
dividends + ((interest expense on debt – interest capitalized) × (1 – tax 
rate) / total assets 
  
Independent 
OC is Ownership Concentration; percentage of ownership shares (votes) of the 
largest shareholder  
OC
2
 is the square of ownership concentration 
Size is the natural log transformation of total assets  
TD/E is the leverage ratio, calculated as the total debt (TD) / equity (E) 
 
Model 1 permits us to test whether firm performance is sensible to monitoring effects of 
ownership concentration. It tests a linear relationship of ownership concentration and firm 
performance, as measured by ROA.  
Following the approach of Morck et al. (1988), we control for Size and Debt Ratio as well. 
We use a natural log transformation of total assets as a measure of firm size in order to 
eliminate scale effects (Baker, 2004; Brealey, Myers, & Marcus, 2007). The nature of the 
agency problem, and as in this case, the marginal effects of ownership structure, may be 
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influenced as well by the debt structure (Jensen M. J., 1989). Therefore, we include the total 
debt / equity ratio as an alternative control variable.   
The inclusion of the ownership concentration and its square in Model 2 permits us to 
explicitly test the monitoring and expropriation effects. The quadratic relation proposed in this 
model presents only one breakpoint, which can be optimally derived by differentiating value 
with respect to ownership concentration. Letting this partial derivative equal zero, this 
breakpoint is OC = -(β1/β2). OC is positive and, consequently, β1 and β2 present opposite 
signs. In addition, the fact that we expect a positive relation because of the larger shareholders 
effect on firm value and negative relation because of the expropriation effect, it implies that 
OC is a maximum, which leads to the condition that β2 < 0 and, therefore, β1 > 0. 
 
2.2. Data and Results 
We collect data from Amadeus (Bureau Van Dijk) for all active listed firms in Italy 
from 2006 to 2009 which include the total population: 186 in 2006; 201 in 2007; 188 in 2008 
and 224 in 2009. The period is particularly interesting as it includes two years of before the 
crisis of 2008 and two years (2008-2009) of the post-crisis period.  
An OLS regression is performed for both models in each year (Table 3 and Table 4). 
We check for possible correlations between variables and except OC and OC2 high 
correlations, we don’t find other relations between the other variables. 
Considering the results of Model 1 (Table 4) it is interesting to notice that ownership 
concentration is significantly related with firm performance, but with a very low coefficient. 
In 2006, it seems that ownership concentration is positively related (meeting the expectations) 
with ROA; for each percentage point increasing in ownership concentration, firms have a 
better performance of 0.05813 (measured by ROA). This relation of course is very weak as 
firms with a single shareholder have a better performance by only 5.81% in confront to firms 
with a maximum diffused ownership. This value increases during the years, but not 
meaningfully. It is interesting to notice that in 2008 (the year of the crisis) this relation is not 
statistically significant. This result may be due to model definition issues, one of which is the 
assumed linear relation between ROA and OC. 
Model 2 instead presents complementary information to the above. Regarding OC and 
OC2 we have statistically insignificant coefficients for 2006, 2007 and 2009 and only for 
2008 we have statistically significant values. It seems that from 2006 and 2007 to 2008, the 
relationship between OC and ROA has diverted from a linear function to a non-linear one; as 
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in 2009 Model 1 coefficients for OC are significant and Model’s 2 coefficients for OC and 
OC2  are not, it suggests a linear function for this year.  
This differences suggest that in 2006, 2007 and 2009 only the monitoring effects have 
influenced the relationship between ownership concentration. The expropriation effect seems 
to gain importance in 2008 during the first symptoms of the financial crisis. This can be 
reasoned because one of the reactions of managers during the risk of crisis might have been 
expropriation of wealth to minority shareholders first. 
OC coefficient in 2008 – Model 2, shows an increasing value of 23.424, which 
suggests a stronger relation between OC and ROA.  
As per the other variables, we have non-significant coefficients for the Debt ratio in 
both models in quite every year, so we cannot draw meaningful conclusions. Size seems to 
respond better for each model with a positive relation. It means that bigger firms have better 
performance than smaller ones.  
 
Conclusions 
It is generally accepted that ownership structure is an important component of 
corporate governance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). As earlier research has given contrasting 
theories and evidences on the relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Demsetz, 1983; Chang, 2003) there is always room for 
further evidences. Differences in the results of prior empirical research that shows absent, 
linear and non-linear relation, might depend on many factors: models variables, relationship 
assumed (linear or non-linear), country, years of study and sample selection. By this mean, 
our study adds further evidences on such debate as we assume a full population from Italy in 
2006-2009 investigating the effects of the crisis over such relation. 
The results confirm the positive relationship between ownership concentration and 
firm value, confirming the agency perspective that higher concentration increases shareholder 
power and control aligning managers and shareholders interests, and consequently increasing 
firm value. 
However, our results show a changing relationship function in 2008 confronting with 
the other years of our analysis, confirming a changing relationship compared to the other three 
years of observation. The non-linear function proves that in 2008, the positive relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm value, decline to a negative relationship. As 2008 
is the first year of the financial crisis this might have influenced the relationship because of 
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increasing expropriation effects contrasting the monitoring effects that dominate during the 
other years. 
 
Table 1 - Correlation Matrix MODEL 2 
 
  
        Size     0.2511   0.0795   0.0394  -0.0772   1.0000
        TD_E     0.1000   0.0559   0.0440   1.0000
         DC2     0.1420   0.9561   1.0000
          DC     0.1395   1.0000
         ROA     1.0000
                                                           
                    ROA       DC      DC2     TD_E     Size
(obs=224)
-> Year = 2009
                                                                                       
        Size     0.2335   0.0148  -0.0560   0.0194   1.0000
        TD_E    -0.0562   0.0111   0.0170   1.0000
         DC2     0.0682   0.9514   1.0000
          DC     0.0398   1.0000
         ROA     1.0000
                                                           
                    ROA       DC      DC2     TD_E     Size
(obs=188)
-> Year = 2008
                                                                                       
        Size     0.2561   0.0576  -0.0409  -0.0113   1.0000
        TD_E     0.0588   0.0564   0.0661   1.0000
         DC2     0.1246   0.9460   1.0000
          DC     0.1582   1.0000
         ROA     1.0000
                                                           
                    ROA       DC      DC2     TD_E     Size
(obs=201)
-> Year = 2007
                                                                                       
        Size     0.2359   0.1388   0.0571  -0.0212   1.0000
        TD_E     0.0421  -0.1290  -0.0876   1.0000
         DC2     0.1929   0.9371   1.0000
          DC     0.1954   1.0000
         ROA     1.0000
                                                           
                    ROA       DC      DC2     TD_E     Size
(obs=186)
-> Year = 2006
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Table 2 - Correlation Matrix Model 1 
 
Table 3 - Model 2 Results of OLS Analysis 
ROA 2006 2007 2008 2009 
OC .507 7.846 23.424** 6.309 
OC
2
 -7.654 -1.116 -34.580*** -16.928 
TD_E .047*** .0345 -.1757029 .0330* 
Size 1.071*** 1.405*** 1.971002*** 1.902*** 
_cons -13.857*** -19.681*** -25.22736*** -28.643*** 
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*,** and *** indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.01 levels. Coefficients not in bold are 
statistically insignificant. 
 
Table 4 - Model 1 Results of OLS Analysis 
ROA 2006 2007 2008 2009 
OC 5.813** 6.882*** 1.875 7.018* 
TD_E .0522 .0344 -.1645 .032* 
Size 1.001*** 1.416*** 1.702*** 1.840*** 
_cons -13.689*** -19.675*** -23.984*** -29.640*** 
*,** and *** indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.01 levels. Coefficients not in bold are 
statistically insignificant. 
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